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MERE SPECULATION: OVEREXTENDING 
CARCIERI v. SALIZAR IN BIG LAGOON 
RANCHERIA v. CALIFORNIA 
Abstract: On January 21, 2014, in Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, a divid-
ed panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the order of 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California directing the State 
of California to negotiate with the Big Lagoon Rancheria toward the develop-
ment of a gaming facility on the tribe’s trust lands. The issues in Big Lagoon 
arose from a collateral attack, long after land had been taken into trust and ad-
ministrative and legal avenues to challenge that decision had expired. This 
Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on the 2009 U.S. Supreme 
Court decision Carcieri v. Salazar was improper, as that decision dealt with a 
timely challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Further, this 
Comment urges the en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit to rely on the 2008 U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Guidiville Band of Pomo In-
dians v. NGV Gaming. This Comment also asserts that, beyond the legal reason-
ing, there are a myriad of public policy reasons for which the Ninth Circuit 
should decline to extend Carcieri to Big Lagoon. 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 21, 2014, in Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, a divided 
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the State of 
California had no obligation to negotiate in good faith with the Big Lagoon 
tribe, which was pursuing the development of a gaming facility on tribal lands 
held in trust by the Federal Government.1 The court held that, because the Sec-
retary of the Interior (“the Secretary”) had lacked the authority to take the land 
in question into trust in 1994, the State had no obligation to enter into negotia-
tions with the tribe.2 The court relied largely on the 2009 U.S. Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 741 F.3d 1032, 1034, 1045 (9th Cir. 2014). The statute 
under which this purchase was made is based on the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (“IRA”). 25 
U.S.C. § 465 (2012); Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1035. The IRA authorizes the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(“BIA”) to purchase land “for the purpose of providing lands to Indians,” with title “taken in the name 
of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the land is acquired.” 25 
U.S.C. § 465; Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1035. 
 2 See Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1034–35, 1045. The IRA gives the Secretary the authority “to 
acquire, through purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands, water 
rights, or surface rights to lands, within or without existing reservations, including trust or otherwise 
restricted allotments . . . for the purpose of providing land for Indians.” 25 U.S.C. § 465. 
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decision Carcieri v. Salazar.3 There, the Court held that the Secretary has au-
thority under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (“IRA”) to take land into 
trust only for those tribes that were federally recognized in 1934.4 
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit relied improperly on Car-
cieri, as it is largely irrelevant to the situation in Big Lagoon.5 Carcieri dealt 
with a timely challenge to a land-into-trust decision, brought under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (“APA”), whereas Big Lagoon addressed a collateral 
attack launched nearly two decades after the Secretary’s decision.6 Part I of 
this Comment discusses the factual and procedural history of Big Lagoon and 
Carcieri, as well as the relevant federal statutes and regulations governing trib-
al land-into-trust procedures and gaming on Indian lands.7 Part II details the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding and Judge Rawlinson’s dissent in Big Lagoon.8 Finally, 
Part III examines the ways in which the Ninth Circuit departed from its own 
precedent in deciding Big Lagoon, as well as the potential implications of its 
holding for landholding Indian tribes across the United States and why the 
Ninth Circuit should apply the 2008 Ninth Circuit decision Guidiville Band of 
Pomo Indians v. NGV Gaming, rather than Carcieri.9 
I. A DENSE, TANGLED WEB: THE ROOTS OF THE BIG LAGOON SAGA, 
CARCIERI V. SALAZAR, AND FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
Since the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Carcieri, the history of Indi-
an tribes’ relationships with the Federal Government has taken on greater focus 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1035, 1044–45. See generally Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 
(2009) (holding that the BIA has authority under the IRA to take land into trust only for those tribes 
that were federally recognized in 1934).  
 4 See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 382–83. 
 5 See id. at 385; Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1046 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting); infra notes 62–78 and 
accompanying text. 
 6 See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012); Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 385; Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1046 
(Rawlinson, J., dissenting); infra notes 65–80 and accompanying text (distinguishing between Car-
cieri’s APA timely challenge and Big Lagoon’s collateral attack). The APA entitles those “suffering 
legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the 
meaning of a relevant statute” to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Actions can be brought against the 
United States “seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an of-
ficer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authori-
ty.” Id. 
 7 See infra notes 10–39 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 40–56 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 57–95 and accompanying text. See generally Guidiville Band of Pomo Indians v. 
NGV Gaming, 531 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2008) (examining a statute defining “Indian lands” in largely 
the same way as the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (“IGRA”), concluding that the statute 
applied to “lands already held in trust by the United States”).  
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and importance.10 Section A of this Part describes the history of the Big La-
goon Rancheria, from its modest beginnings as a single family on a Northern 
California homestead to its formal tribal recognition by the Federal Govern-
ment.11 Section B of this Part details the failed negotiations and subsequent 
ongoing litigation between the tribe and the State of California.12 
A. The History of the Big Lagoon Rancheria, from Homestead to Formal 
Recognition and Entrustment 
The saga of Big Lagoon begins in 1918, when the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs (“BIA”) bought a nine-acre parcel of land as a homestead for James Char-
ley and his family.13 The land was apparently abandoned and vacant for more 
than 30 years.14 In the mid-1950s, Thomas Williams and his wife camped on 
the property with BIA permission, though they made no ownership claim.15 
In 1967, Thomas Williams and his wife requested dissolution and distri-
bution of the parcel under the amended California Rancheria Termination 
Act.16 A 1968 BIA memorandum stated that the land was not originally ac-
quired for any specific Indian group and that its current inhabitants were not 
part of a formal tribe.17 Despite this, the BIA in 1968 approved the distribution 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See 555 U.S. at 382–83; infra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (explaining that Big La-
goon’s history with the Federal Government was a key aspect in the State trying to avoid negotiating a 
gaming compact with the tribe). 
 11 See infra notes 13–24 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 25–39 and accompanying text. 
 13 See 741 F.3d at 1034. The BIA is part of the Department of the Interior. 25 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2014). 
The Ninth Circuit, citing BIA records, stated that the purchase was made with “an appropriation ‘to 
purchase land for village homes for the landless Indians of California.’” Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 
1034. A 1960 memorandum written by the U.S. Solicitor of Indian Affairs details these appropria-
tions. See Declaration of Randall A. Pinal in Support of Defendant State of California’s Opposition to 
Plaintiff Big Lagoon Rancheria’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment at Exhibit S, Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 759 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(No. 09-1471), ECF No. 88. 
 14 Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1034. During the period 1942–1946, James Charley’s son Robert may 
have lived on the land. Id. 
 15 Id. Thomas Williams was Robert Charley’s nephew by marriage. Id. 
 16 See California Rancheria Termination Act, Pub. L. No. 88-419, 78 Stat. 390 (1964); Big La-
goon, 741 F.3d at 1034. Congress adopted the California Rancheria Termination Act in 1958. See 
Pub. L. No. 85-671, 72 Stat. 619. The stated purpose of the Act was, “[T]o provide for the distribution 
of the land and assets of certain Indian rancherias and reservations in California, and for other purpos-
es.” Id. The Act automatically dissolved forty-three rancherias (California’s term for small Indian 
settlements), some of which were later restored. Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1034. The Act was amended 
in 1964 with a process through which any Rancheria could be dissolved and distributed upon request. 
Pub. L. No. 88-419, 78 Stat. 390; Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1034. 
 17 Declaration of Randall A. Pinal, supra note 13, at Exhibit T. The memo stated that the land 
“was not set aside for any specific tribe, band or group of Indians” when originally acquired in 1918, 
and that the occupants “have not formally organized” and did not have “allotments or formal assign-
ments.” Id. 
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of the land to the Williamses.18 For unknown reasons, the land was never dis-
tributed and the request was withdrawn.19 
Nevertheless, in 1979 the tribe was first included in the list of “Indian 
Tribal Entities That Have a Government-to-Government Relationship with the 
United States.”20 Membership in what is now the Big Lagoon Rancheria has 
been based on the BIA’s 1968 land distribution list, with the tribe’s members 
tracing their ancestry to Thomas Williams.21 In 1994, the BIA purchased a 
nearby—but separate—eleven-acre parcel, taking it into trust “for Big Lagoon 
Rancheria, a Federally Recognized Indian Rancheria” pursuant to the IRA.22 
On this eleven-acre parcel, Big Lagoon subsequently sought to establish “class 
III” gaming activities.23 This class of gaming is regulated on Indian lands ac-
cording to the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (“IGRA”).24 
B. Federal Indian Gaming Law, Carcieri v. Salazar, and the Litigation 
History of Big Lagoon 
The IGRA permits gaming on Indian lands if, among other requirements, 
the tribe and state create a compact to govern the gaming activities.25 The 
IGRA requires that states negotiate such compacts in good faith.26 In 1998 and 
1999, the State of California put forward a model compact for tribes pursuing 
                                                                                                                           
 18 Id. at Exhibit FF; see Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1035. The Williams’ daughter and her husband 
were also living on the land at the time and were also beneficiaries of the distribution plan. Declara-
tion of Randall A. Pinal, supra note 13, at Exhibit DD, EE. 
 19 Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1035. 
 20 Indian Tribal Entities That Have a Government-to-Government Relationship with the United 
States, 44 Fed. Reg. 7235 (Feb. 6, 1979). This list is today maintained as “Indian Entities Recognized 
and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs,” and Big Lagoon 
Rancheria continues to be included. 80 Fed. Reg. 1942, 1943 (Jan. 14, 2015). 
 21 Declaration of Randall A. Pinal, supra note 13, at Exhibit GG. 
 22 25 U.S.C. § 2202 (2012); Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1035; Declaration of Randall A. Pinal, supra 
note 13, at Exhibit D; supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. The IRA defines the term “Indian” as: 
[A]ll persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now 
under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such members who 
were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, 
and . . . all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood. 
25 U.S.C. § 479 (2012). 
 23 Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1034. 
 24 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2012). Congress enacted the IGRA to establish a framework for the 
operation and regulation of gaming on Indian lands. Id. § 2702(1)–(2) (2012); Big Lagoon Rancheria 
v. California, 759 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The IGRA defines “Indian Lands” as “all 
lands within the limits of any Indian reservation” and “any lands title to which is . . . held in trust by 
the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual . . . and over which an Indian tribe 
exercises governmental power.” 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4) (2012). 
 25 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (“Class III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands . . . if such 
activities are . . . conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact . . . .”). 
 26 Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (“Upon receiving . . . a request, the State shall negotiate with the Indian 
tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact.”). 
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class III gaming on their lands.27 Big Lagoon did not accept the proposed 
compact, and, in 1999, the tribe filed a complaint against the State of Califor-
nia in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging 
that the State had not negotiated in good faith.28 
After numerous failed negotiations, Big Lagoon commenced suit for a 
second time in April 2009.29 The State, in its answer, acknowledged that Big 
Lagoon was a federally recognized tribe and the trust beneficiary of lands 
within Humboldt County, California.30 But the State also argued that it was not 
                                                                                                                           
 27 Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1036. The IGRA sets out three categories or “classes” of gaming. 25 
U.S.C. § 2703(6)–(8). Relevant to the Big Lagoon case is class III, which includes “slot machines, 
casino games, banking card games, dog racing and lotteries.” See Big Lagoon Rancheria, 759 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1152. 
 28 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 98004 (West 2014); Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1036; Complaint, Big 
Lagoon Rancheria, 759 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (No. 99–4995). Some tribes did, however, accept the com-
pact as proposed. Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1036. California is one of the jurisdictions in which tribes 
can bring suit against the state government for failure to negotiate in good faith. See 25 U.S.C. 
§ 2710(d)(7)(A)(1); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 98005 (West 2014); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44, 47 (1996); Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l Union v. Davis, 981 P.2d 990, 994 (Cal. 1999). 
Under the IGRA, tribes can commence an action against states that fail to negotiate in good faith. 25 
U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7). In 1996, in Seminole Tribe of Florida, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that this provision runs afoul of the Commerce Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; 517 U.S. at 
47 (reasoning that states must consent to actions brought under the ‘good-faith’ requirement of the 
IGRA, as Congress lacks the power to revoke states’ immunity to such suits). The Court therefore 
held that such suits could only occur with the consent of the state. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47. 
The State of California has consented to these suits. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 98005; Big Lagoon Ranche-
ria, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 1152; Davis, 981 P.2d at 994. The IGRA lays out a framework for such ac-
tions, which can result in the district court compelling negotiations, forcing mediation, and, if need be, 
the Secretary of the Interior ultimately proscribing terms. See Big Lagoon Rancheria, 759 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1152–53. 
 29 See Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1037. Big Lagoon and the State continued to negotiate while liti-
gation moved forward. Id. at 1036. In 2005, an agreement was reached under which Big Lagoon, 
along with another group, would be permitted to operate a casino on non-Indian lands in Barstow, 
California. Id. As part of the settlement, Big Lagoon’s suit against the State was dismissed without 
prejudice. Id. The California legislature, however, failed to ratify the agreement (as required by Cali-
fornia law for it to take effect). Id. The agreement ultimately lapsed, and in September 2007 the tribe 
sent the State a request for renewed negotiations to establish class III gaming on Big Lagoon Ranche-
ria trust lands. Id. Subsequent negotiations centered on the site of the proposed casino, with the tribe 
preferring the eleven-acre parcel. See id. at 1036–37. The State, in turn, suggested a number of alter-
natives. See id. at 1037. The State’s proposed alternatives included: locating all development on a 
separate, nearby property; placing the casino on the nine-acre parcel, the hotel on the eleven-acre 
parcel, and parking on a separate, nearby property; and placing the casino on the nine-acre parcel, the 
hotel on the eleven-acre parcel, and dividing parking between the two sites. Id. For the latter two sug-
gestions, the State would require both environmental mitigation and revenue sharing. Id. The tribe 
agreed to some environmental mitigation steps, but rejected the options that included land other than 
the tribe’s trust lands and sharing revenue with the State. Id. The State then expressed a willingness to 
permit Big Lagoon to develop a casino and hotel “on the Rancheria,” but would not allow the con-
struction of a tower of the height desired by the tribe and continued to insist on environmental mitiga-
tion and revenue sharing. Id. 
 30 Defendant State of California’s Answer to Complaint Pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulato-
ry Act at 2, Big Lagoon Rancheria, 759 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (No. 09-1471). The State conceded that, 
“Big Lagoon is currently on a list of federally recognized tribes, [and] that the United States considers 
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obligated to negotiate with Big Lagoon because the tribe was ineligible to have 
land taken into trust by the Federal Government on its behalf.31 
The State asserted this affirmative defense because of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s February 2009 decision in Carcieri.32 Carcieri was brought by the 
State of Rhode Island as a timely challenge under the APA to the Secretary’s 
decision under the IRA to take land into trust for a Rhode Island tribe.33 The 
Court held that the BIA has authority under the IRA to take land into trust only 
for those tribes that were federally recognized at the time of the IRA’s enact-
ment—1934.34 Citing Carcieri, the State of California asserted in Big Lagoon 
that the land in question was “not ‘Indian lands’ eligible for gaming under 
IGRA” because Big Lagoon was not federally recognized in 1934.35 The state 
argued that it was therefore not in the public interest for the state to enter nego-
tiations for gaming on land not lawfully acquired in trust.36 
In November 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California held that the State of California had failed to negotiate in good 
                                                                                                                           
the Rancheria to be the trust beneficiary of certain lands the federal government owns in Humboldt 
County, California . . . .” Id. 
 31 Id. at 5. In its Answer, the State put forward, for the first time, the following “affirmative de-
fense”: 
Big Lagoon is not entitled to injunctive relief compelling Governor Arnold Schwarzeneg-
ger to negotiate a Compact authorizing class III gaming on land taken in trust for the 
Rancheria subsequent to October 17, 1988, because Big Lagoon is not eligible to be a 
beneficiary of a trust conveyance pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 465 and, thus, was never entitled 
to a beneficial interest in that land. 
Id. 
 32 See Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1041. See generally Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379 (holding that the BIA 
has authority under the IRA to take land into trust only for those tribes that were federally recognized 
in 1934). 
 33 555 U.S. at 382. The APA allows civil suits against the Federal Government challenging “final 
agency actions” where judicial review is not otherwise granted by statute. 5 U.S.C. § 702, 704 (2012); 
Brief for United States as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En 
Banc at 7, Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d 1032 (No. 10-17803). The APA is the proper forum for challenging a 
land-into-trust decision. See 5 U.S.C. § 702; Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians 
v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (2012); Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 385; Kansas v. United States, 249 F.3d 
1213, 1222–23 (10th Cir. 2001); Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth., No. 2:13–CV–178–WKW, 2014 WL 
1400232, at *1, *15 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 10, 2014). The general six-year statute of limitations applies to chal-
lenges under the APA. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2012); Wind River Mining Corp. v. United States, 946 F.2d 
710, 713 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 34 See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 382–83. The Carcieri decision hinged upon the IRA phrase “now 
under Federal jurisdiction,” with the Court concluding that the proper interpretation of the word 
“now” is “when the IRA was enacted in 1934.” See 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2012); 555 U.S. at 395. Because 
the Narragansett Tribe was not under Federal jurisdiction at the time of the IRA’s enactment, the 
Court held that the Secretary lacked authority to take the land into trust on the tribe’s behalf. Carcieri, 
555 U.S. at 382–83. 
 35 Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1038. 
 36 Id. During subsequent oral arguments before the district court, the State asserted that it was 
only challenging the status of the eleven-acre parcel—not that of the nine-acre parcel. Id. 
186 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
faith.37 The court granted the tribe’s motion for summary judgment, conclud-
ing that neither the status of the tribe nor its land affected its right to good-faith 
negotiations with the state.38 Both parties appealed the District Court’s rul-
ing.39 
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION: CARCIERI CONTROLS 
In 2014, in Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, a split three-judge panel 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Big Lagoon did not 
have jurisdiction over the land in question and could not request negotiations 
with the State, relieving the State of any obligation to negotiate in good faith.40 
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, because Big Lagoon was not federally recog-
nized in 1934, it was not eligible to have land taken into trust on its behalf, and 
thus did not possess “Indian Lands” under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
of 1988 (IGRA).41 
The court further held that the State of California’s objection to the 1994 
entrustment was permissible despite the applicability of a six-year statute of 
limitations, citing the 1991 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit deci-
                                                                                                                           
 37 Big Lagoon Rancheria, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 1162. Citing the 2010 U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rincon Band of Luiseño Mission Indians v. Schwarzenegger, the district 
court held that, while revenue sharing and environmental mitigation were appropriate topics for nego-
tiation, the State’s non-negotiable stance on them constituted bad faith. See id. at 1159, 1162; see also 
Rincon Band of Luiseño Mission Indians v. Schwarzenegger, 602 F.3d 1019, 1042 (9th. Cir. 2010) 
(holding that the State’s demand for contribution of a portion of tribal gaming revenue for the State’s 
general fund in exchange for expanded class III gaming rights constituted imposition of a tax and 
evidence of bad faith negotiation). 
 38 See Big Lagoon Rancheria, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 1160. The district court also held that the Car-
cieri decision had no bearing on the State’s obligation to negotiate in good faith because the decision 
came after the negotiations. See id. at 1159–60. The court directed the tribe and the State to either 
agree to a compact within 60 days, or to submit their proposals to a court-appointed mediator. Id. at 
1163. The parties continued to negotiate but, unable to reach an agreement, submitted their proposals 
to a mediator. Id. at 1039. The State proposed waiving revenue sharing in exchange for a number of 
environmental mitigation measures. Id. The tribe offered to contribute revenue to gaming-related trust 
funds and to prepare an environmental impact report and continue to negotiate environmental mitiga-
tion with the appropriate State agency. Id. After reviewing both proposals, the mediator concluded 
that “the compact that best comports with the terms of the IGRA, applicable federal law, and [the 
district court’s order]” was Big Lagoon’s. Id. The court subsequently stayed further proceedings pend-
ing appeal. Id. 
 39 Id. at 1038–39. 
 40 741 F.3d 1032, 1034, 1045 (9th Cir. 2014) (reversing the decision of the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of California); see supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
 41 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4) (2012); Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 382–83 (2009); Big Lagoon, 
741 F.3d at 1045. The court based its reasoning on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Car-
cieri, holding that the tribe did not have jurisdiction over the land in question and could not request 
negotiations with the State, relieving the State of the obligation to negotiate in good faith. See Car-
cieri, 555 U.S. at 382–83; Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1045. 
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sion in Wind River Mining Corp. v. United States.42 In Wind River, the court 
held that APA challenges of administrative decisions of federal agencies could 
be brought within six years of an agency’s application of its decision to a spe-
cific challenger.43 The Big Lagoon court treated the tribe’s suit to compel nego-
tiations with the State as akin to the application of an administrative decision, 
and therefore held that the six-year time limit began to run only when that suit 
was brought—April 2009.44 
Finally, the court distinguished Big Lagoon from the 2008 U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision in Guidiville Band of Pomo Indians v. 
NGV Gaming.45 In Guidiville, the court interpreted the definition of “Indian 
lands” in a federal statute that gives the U.S. government oversight in contracts 
and agreements that affect Indian lands.46 The court held that this statute “ap-
plie[d] only to contracts that affect lands already held in trust by the United 
States.”47 The Guidiville court also examined the section of the IGRA at issue in 
Big Lagoon, concluding that the IGRA defines “Indian lands” in largely the 
same way.48 The court in Big Lagoon held that Guidiville was not applicable, 
however, because it dealt with land to be taken into trust in the future, whereas 
the decision at issue in Big Lagoon was a past entrustment.49 The court therefore 
reasoned that Wind River was the more analogous case.50 
The dissenting opinion in Big Lagoon argued that Guidiville—rather than 
Wind River and Carcieri—should control.51 The dissent contended that the def-
                                                                                                                           
 42 Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1043; Wind River Mining Corp. v. United States, 946 F.2d 710, 716 
(9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the general six-year statute of limitations for civil actions against the 
federal government applies to APA actions). 
 43 See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012); Wind River, 946 F.2d at 716. Wind River involved a mining compa-
ny challenge of a land classification decision by the Bureau of Land Management. 946 F.2d at 711–
12. 
 44 See 741 F.3d at 1037, 1043. The court explicitly noted that it was extending the holding of 
Wind River, which dealt with a direct enforcement action by the decision-making agency, to the third-
party enforcement situation at issue in Big Lagoon. See id. at 1043; Wind River, 946 F.2d at 716. The 
court also observed that the State may not have had sufficient concern to bring a challenge at the time 
of the 1994 entrustment decision. See Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1043. 
 45 Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1042. See generally Guidiville Band of Pomo Indians v. NGV Gam-
ing, 531 F.3d 767 (2008) (examining a statute defining “Indian lands” in largely the same way as the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (“IGRA”), concluding that the statute applied to “lands al-
ready held in trust by the United States”). 
 46 25 U.S.C. § 81(a)(1) (2012) (defining “Indian lands” as “lands the title to which is held by the 
United States in trust for an Indian tribe or lands the title to which is held by an Indian tribe subject to 
a restriction by the United States against alienation”); 531 F.3d at 769. 
 47 Guidiville, 531 F.3d at 770. The court interpreted the word “is” in its most literal, present-tense 
sense. See 25 U.S.C. § 81(a)(1); Guidiville, 531 F.3d at 770. 
 48 See Guidiville, 531 F.3d at 778. 
 49 Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1042. 
 50 See id. at 1042–43. 
 51 Id. at 1047 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that the Carcieri decision did not 
overrule the Ninth Circuit’s Guidiville definition of “Indian lands,” but rather simply interpreted a 
general definition of “Indian” in the IRA and did not address the IGRA in any way. Id. at 1046–47; 
188 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:E. Supp. 
inition at the heart of Carcieri was interpreted in the course of a timely chal-
lenge under the APA of a land-into-trust decision.52 In contrast, the dissent 
characterized the objection at issue in Big Lagoon as a “collateral challenge to 
the legitimacy of a designation of trust property outside the parameters of the 
Administrative Procedure Act.”53 Indeed, the dissent noted, nearly eighteen 
years passed after the decision to place the land in trust, with no challenge 
from the State of California.54 To allow such a challenge after formal adminis-
trative and judicial avenues have long expired would fly in the face of prece-
dent, the dissent argued.55 
On June 11, 2014, the Ninth Circuit ordered that the case be reheard en 
banc.56 
III. BIG LAGOON: A DANGEROUS DECISION AND ITS POTENTIAL 
IMPLICATIONS FOR TRIBES ACROSS THE COUNTRY 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 2014 decision in Big 
Lagoon Rancheria v. California is problematic for a number of reasons, most 
notably its improper overextension of the 2009 U.S. Supreme Court decision 
Carcieri v. Salazar and its departure from established Ninth Circuit prece-
dent.57 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s decision demonstrates the uncertainty 
tribal trust lands throughout the United States face in the wake of the Car-
cieri.58 Section A of this Part examines the dubious reasoning employed by the 
                                                                                                                           
see 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4) (2012) (“The term ‘Indian lands’ means any lands title to which is . . . held in 
trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe . . . .”); 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2012) (“The term 
‘Indian’ as used in this Act shall include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recog-
nized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction . . . .”); Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 395 (reasoning that 
“Indian” in the IRA referred to those tribes federally recognized in 1934); Guidiville, 531 F.3d at 770 
(concluding that “Indian lands” in 25 U.S.C. § 81 “applies only to contracts that affect lands already 
held in trust by the United States”). 
 52 Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1046; see 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012); Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 385. 
 53 Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1046; see 5 U.S.C. § 702. The dissent notes that 25 U.S.C. § 465 and 
its implementing regulations contain provisions to challenge land-into-trust actions. Big Lagoon, 741 
F.3d at 1046 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting). These include expressly granting state and local governments 
the chance to object to a tribe’s application. See id. The decision can also be challenged both adminis-
tratively and in federal courts. See id. 
 54 See Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1046. 
 55 See id. The dissent cites Wind River’s holding that a challenge under the APA must be brought 
within six years of the challenged action. See id.; Wind River, 946 F.2d at 716. 
 56 Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 758 F.3d 1073, 1073 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 57 See 5 U.S.C. § 702; Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 741 F.3d 1032, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 
2014) (Rawlinson, J., dissenting); Brief for Amici Curiae National Congress of American Indians, et 
al. in Support of Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 6, Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d 1032 
(No. 10-17803); Brief for United States, supra note 33, at 1. See generally Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 
U.S. 379 (2009) (holding that the BIA has authority under the IRA to take land into trust only for 
those tribes that were federally recognized in 1934). 
 58 See Brief for Nat’l Congress of American Indians, supra note 57, at 12; Brief for United States, 
supra note 33, at 12; David Coventry Smith, Defending Indian Lands After Carcieri, in EMERGING 
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court in Big Lagoon.59 Section B of this Part urges the en banc panel of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to decline to continue the overex-
tension of Carcieri and instead apply the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit’s 2008 decision in Guidiville Band of Pomo Indians v. NGV Gaming.60 
Section B of this Part further discusses the potential implications the overex-
tension of Carcieri could have for lands taken into trust after 1934 and the po-
tentially devastating impact on the already vulnerable economic and social 
wellbeing of tribes across the country.61 
A. How the Ninth Circuit Departed from Precedent and Overextended 
Carcieri in Big Lagoon 
First, because Carcieri addressed a timely Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934 (“IRA”) challenge properly brought under the Administrative Procedures 
Act (“APA”), the Ninth Circuit erred in applying its holding to the situation 
before the court in Big Lagoon.62 Indeed, as the dissent in Big Lagoon noted, 
to try to determine how Carcieri would have been decided if the challenge had 
been brought outside the timely boundaries of the APA would be mere specula-
tion.63 
                                                                                                                           
ISSUES IN TRIBAL-STATE RELATIONS 6, 6 (Aspatore ed., 2014); Rob Capriccioso, Big Lagoon 
Rancheria v. California: The Latest Threat to Tribal Land, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NET-
WORK (Feb. 3, 2014), available at http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2014/02/03/big-
lagoon-rancheria-v-california-latest-threat-tribal-land-153388, archived at http://perma.cc/TY9A-TJH6; 
Lael Echo-Hawk, Big Lagoon Decision Could Seriously Impact Indian Country, GARVEY SCHUBERT 
BARER LEGAL UPDATE (Jan. 22, 2014), available at https://www.gsblaw.com/news/legal_update/
big_lagoon_decision_could_seriously_impact_indian_country, archived at https://perma.cc/C7WE-
DN58. 
 59 See infra notes 62–78 and accompanying text. 
 60 See infra notes 79–84 and accompanying text. 
 61 See infra notes 85–95 and accompanying text. 
 62 See 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2012) (“The Secretary of the Interior is authorized . . . to acquire . . . any 
interest in lands, water rights, or surface rights to lands, within or without existing reservations, in-
cluding trust or otherwise restricted allotments . . . for the purpose of providing land for Indians.”); 
Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 385 (noting that “[p]etitioners sought review of the IBIA decision pursuant to 
the Administrative Procedure Act”); Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1046 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Carcieri “follow[ed] a timely challenge to the Secretary’s decision 
under the Administrative Procedure Act”); City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior 
Chippewa, 702 F.3d 1147, 1153 (8th Cir. 2013) (stating that a municipal government challenge to a 
National Indian Gaming Commission decision should have been brought under the APA); Alabama v. 
PCI Gaming Authority, No. 2:13–CV–178–WKW, 2014 WL 1400232, at *1, *16–17 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 10, 
2014) (“[T]he court rejects the State’s Carcieri-based collateral challenge . . . to the Secretary’s decades-
old land-into-trust decisions.”); Smith, supra note 58, at 9 (questioning the Big Lagoon court’s decision 
to begin running the statute of limitations in 2009 rather than at the time of the 1994 entrustment). 
 63 See Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1047 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting) (“[W]e cannot say how the Su-
preme Court would have ruled if the challenger in Carcieri had not filed a timely challenge under the 
Administrative Procedure Act or had sued under a different statute entirely.”). 
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The Big Lagoon court essentially permitted an end-run around the estab-
lished process for challenging a land-into-trust decision.64 In 1991, in Wind 
River Mining Corp. v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit simply held that an APA challenge could be brought within six years of 
the application or enforcement of the decision to the challenging party.65 Stark 
differences exist, however, between such a scenario and Big Lagoon—most 
glaringly, the absence of agency enforcement.66 The court in Big Lagoon also 
invokes Wind River in observing that the original 1994 entrustment may not 
have caused the State of California sufficient “concern” to prompt a challenge 
under the APA.67 In 1997, however, prior to Big Lagoon’s commencement of 
litigation, the State attempted to intervene in a challenge to the land-into-trust 
decision.68 The State, therefore, had the opportunity and the notice to challenge 
the land-into-trust decision both before and after it was originally made.69 Yet 
the State of California chose not to take advantage of either of those well-worn 
options—as the petitioners in Carcieri did—for nearly two decades.70 To per-
mit the State to invoke the APA so long after the original decision, despite the 
present case’s departure from the holding of Wind River and the State’s wasted 
opportunity to file a timely challenge in the 1990s, would amount to allowing 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See Brief for Nat’l Congress of American Indians, supra note 57, at 6 (“In addition to exhaus-
tion requirements, 28 U.S.C.§ 2401(a) imposes a six year statute of limitations on APA challenges to 
final agency action. The Court prohibits claimants from making an ‘end run’ around such require-
ments by disguising untimely claims as collateral attacks or defenses.”); infra note 83 and accompany-
ing text. 
 65 See 946 F.2d 710, 716 (9th Cir. 1991). It is also curious that the court chose Big Lagoon’s 2009 
suit to compel negotiations as the commencement of the six-year APA statute of limitations. See Big 
Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1037, 1043. Even if the court’s extension of Wind River to the facts of Big La-
goon were proper, and the State was only put on actual notice when the tribe brought suit against it, 
the court apparently overlooked the fact that the compact negotiations began in 1998, with the tribe 
first filing suit in 1999. Complaint, supra note 28; see Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1036; Brief for United 
States, supra note 33, at 10 n.5. Under this timeline, the State’s ability to bring an APA challenge 
would have expired in 2004 or 2005. See Brief for United States, supra note 33, at 10 n.5. 
 66 See Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1043; Brief for United States, supra note 33, at 10–11. The result-
ing proceedings leave out the Department of the Interior, with no opportunity to complete the record 
or defend its decision and its property interest. See Brief for Nat’l Congress of American Indians, 
supra note 57, at 7–8; Brief for United States, supra note 33, at 15–16. 
 67 See Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1043. The court made the observation almost in passing, devoting 
just one sentence to the subject. See id. 
 68 See id. at 1036; Brief for Nat’l Congress of American Indians, supra note 57, at 10; Brief for 
United States, supra note 33, at 10. 
 69 See Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1043; Brief for Nat’l Congress of American Indians, supra note 
57, at 9–10; Brief for United States, supra note 33, at 10. Prior to a final trust decision, federal regula-
tions afford states the opportunity to object to land-into-trust applications. Guidiville Band of Pomo Indi-
ans v. NGV Gaming, 531 F.3d 767, 777 (9th Cir. 2008); 25 C.F.R. § 151.10–11 (2014). 
 70 See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 385; Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1046 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting). 
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an end-run around long-established procedures.71 The Ninth Circuit has previ-
ously prohibited such maneuvers.72 
Finally, the court employs problematic logic in its choice to turn away 
from Ninth Circuit precedent, namely the Ninth Circuit’s 2008 decision in 
Guidiville Band of Pomo Indians v. NGV Gaming.73 The court distinguished 
Guidiville from Big Lagoon by reasoning that, while Big Lagoon concerns a 
past entrustment, Guidiville dealt with a future entrustment.74 That distinction 
is irrelevant for purposes of Big Lagoon.75 In Guidiville, the court defined “In-
dian Lands” as meaning real estate “title to [which] must already be held by 
the United States in trust for a tribe.”76 That this was not the case in 
Guidiville—and is in Big Lagoon—has little effect on the definition itself or its 
applicability to the latter case.77 Indeed, the land in question in Big Lagoon 
clearly meets the Guidiville court’s definition of “Indian Lands.”78 
B. The Troubling Implications for Tribes Across the Country if the En Banc 
Court Fails to Follow Guidiville 
Despite the Ninth Circuit panel’s inappropriate application of Carcieri to 
Big Lagoon, the Ninth Circuit, in rehearing the case en banc, should look to its 
own precedent and apply Guidiville.79 Guidiville held that “Indian lands” in-
                                                                                                                           
 71 See Brief for Nat’l Congress of American Indians, supra note 57, at 6. 
 72 See United States v. Backlund, 689 F.3d 986, 1000 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Lowry, 
512 F.3d 1194, 1202–03 (9th Cir. 2008); Brief for Nat’l Congress of American Indians, supra note 57, 
at 6. 
 73 See Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1045 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting); Brief for United States, supra 
note 33, at 14–15. See generally Guidiville, 531 F.3d 767 (examining a statute defining “Indian lands” 
in largely the same way as the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (“IGRA”), concluding that the 
statute applied to “lands already held in trust by the United States”). 
 74 See Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1042 (“In Guidiville, we held that land to be entrusted in the fu-
ture did not qualify as ‘Indian lands’ . . . . Here, by contrast, we are called upon to decide whether a 
past entrustment qualifies if it turns out to have been invalid.”); Guidiville, 531 F.3d at 769 (concluding 
that 25 U.S.C. § 81 “applies only to contracts that affect lands already held in trust by the United 
States”). 
 75 Brief for United States, supra note 33, at 14–15. 
 76 See Guidiville, 531 F.3d at 775. 
 77 See Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1045–46 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting); Brief for United States, su-
pra note 33, at 14–15. 
 78 See Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1047 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting) (“Indian lands for the purpose of 
IGRA includes lands held in trust for a tribe at the time of the gaming contract.”); Brief for United 
States, supra note 33, at 14 (“[T]he parcel ‘is held in trust’ for the Tribe and thus meets the require-
ment of IGRA.”). 
 79 See Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1045–46 (Rawlison, J., dissenting). The dissent notes the high 
standard for departing from Ninth Circuit precedent. See id. at 1047. In the 2012 U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit decision Lair v. Bullock, for example, the court held that “as long as [the 
court] can apply our prior circuit precedent without running afoul of the intervening authority, [it] 
must do so.” 697 F.3d 1200, 1207 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This 
standard applies even when “intervening authority creates ‘some tension’ with . . . or ‘cast[s] doubt’ 
on [the court’s] precedent.” See Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1047 (quoting Lair, 697 F.3d at 1207). In-
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cluded those lands presently held in trust for a tribe.80 Under this definition, the 
lands at issue in Big Lagoon were “Indian lands” at the time the tribe’s request 
for compact negotiations was made, and the State was therefore compelled to 
negotiate in good faith.81 
Additional public policy concerns support the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of 
the panel’s decision in Big Lagoon.82 Among these compelling interests is the 
preservation of the integrity of the avenues for challenge set forth in federal 
regulations and the APA.83 To allow California this “end-run” around estab-
lished forums for orderly challenges to land-into-trust decisions would render 
                                                                                                                           
deed, the standard is very high: the intervening authority must be “clearly inconsistent” with Ninth 
Circuit precedent. See id. 
 80 See 531 F.3d at 778 (stating that the IGRA “defines ‘Indian lands’ in much the same manner as 
[25 U.S.C. § 81]”); see also Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1047 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting). 
 81 See 741 F.3d at 1047 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting); Guidiville, 531 F.3d at 778. 
 82 See 741 F.3d at 1046 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting); PCI Gaming, 2014 WL 1400232, at *15; 
Smith, supra note 58, at 10 (arguing that “Indian country needs a strong and uniform response to the 
growing threat to tribal governments by the efforts of states to encroach on Indian lands”); Capriccio-
so, supra note 58 (“The [Big Lagoon] ruling has major implications for Indian country beyond the 
California tribe . . . .”); Lael Echo-Hawk, supra note 58 (noting that Big Lagoon could open up chal-
lenges to land-into-trust decisions “EVEN if the statutory time to challenge the action under the Ad-
ministrative Procedures [sic] Act has expired”). 
 83 See Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1046 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting); PCI Gaming, 2014 WL 
1400232, at *15; Smith, supra note 58. The APA is the proper forum for challenging a land-into-trust 
decision. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C) (2012) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action . . . not in accordance with law [or] in excess of statutory jurisdiction [or] authori-
ty . . . .”); see also Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 
2199, 2208 (2012) (“[Plaintiff] asserts merely that the Secretary’s decision to take land into trust vio-
lates a federal statute—a garden-variety APA claim.”); Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 385 (noting that 
“[p]etitioners sought review of the [Interior Board of Indian Appeals] decision pursuant to the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act”); Kansas v. United States, 249 F.3d 1213, 1222–23 (10th Cir. 2001) (con-
cluding that the APA is the appropriate statute for the State of Kansas to challenge the National Indian 
Gaming Commission’s decision that a tract of land constitutes “Indian Lands” for purposes of the 
IGRA); PCI Gaming, 2014 WL 1400232, at *15 (“The APA indisputably provides a proper frame-
work for challenging the Secretary’s land-into-trust decisions.”). Section 2401 states that civil actions 
against the United States must be commenced within six years of the right of action accruing. 28 
U.S.C. § 2401 (2012). The Ninth Circuit has held that § 2401 applies to challenges to federal agency 
decisions, which “must be brought within six years of the agency’s application of the disputed deci-
sion to the challenger.” Wind River, 946 F.2d at 716. Furthermore, prior to a final trust decision, fed-
eral regulations afford states the opportunity to object to land-into-trust applications. See 25 C.F.R. 
§ 151.10–.11 (2014); see also Guidiville, 531 F.3d at 777 (“With . . . initial information in hand, the 
Department of the Interior then gives state and local governments the opportunity to object to the 
tribe’s application . . . .”). After receiving a request for reservation lands to be taken into trust, the 
Secretary is required to notify state and local governments with jurisdiction over the land in question. 
25 C.F.R. § 151.10. The state and local governments are then “given 30 days in which to provide 
written comments as to the acquisition’s potential impacts on regulatory jurisdiction, real property 
taxes and special assessments.” Id. The same process is followed for off-reservation requests. Id. 
§ 151.11. 
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these processes moot and signal open season for challenges of long-past deci-
sions.84 
More troubling still for hundreds of tribes across the United States is the 
continuing and growing threat the Big Lagoon holding represents.85 The Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) currently recognizes 566 tribes.86 Of these, only 
258 appear on a list of federally recognized tribes compiled shortly after pas-
sage of the IRA.87 Some 308 tribes, therefore, stand to potentially lose sover-
eignty over their trust lands if Big Lagoon stands.88 The Federal Government 
has taken millions of acres into trust under the IRA since 1934, all of which 
could become exposed to collateral attack.89 Such an outcome would be devas-
tating, threatening the economic and social wellbeing of tribes in states across 
the country.90 As it stands, the Big Lagoon decision has brought great uncer-
                                                                                                                           
 84 See Smith, supra note 58, at 6–7, 9–11 (discussing the increase in land-into-trust challenges 
following Carcieri, the looming threat to tribal economic development, and the problematic reasoning 
employed in applying Carcieri to the facts of Big Lagoon). 
 85 See Brief for Nat’l Congress of American Indians, supra note 57, at 12 (“The majority’s deci-
sion, if left uncorrected, will have devastating impacts throughout Indian country on a wide array of 
issues that have nothing to do with Indian gaming.”); Brief for United States, supra note 33, at 12 
(“The majority’s ruling would ‘virtually nullify the statute of limitations’ for challenges to well-settled 
agency decisions . . . thereby undermining the finality of agency actions in general.” (quoting Shiny 
Rock Mining Corp. v. United States, 906 F.2d 1362, 1365 (9th Cir. 1990))); Smith, supra note 58, at 6 
(noting that Carcieri presented “an opportunity to break down the trust barrier that had historically 
been imposed in gaining access to the lands, personal property and income of individual Indians and 
tribes”); Capriccioso, supra note 58 (arguing that Big Lagoon “provides precedent for legal challenges 
that could remove and/or prevent development on trust lands from all tribes federally recognized after 
1934”); Echo-Hawk, supra note 58 (“Any tribe who [sic] was recognized post-1934 . . . and had land 
placed into trust by the BIA prior to or after the Carcieri decision, is now vulnerable to having that 
administrative action challenged.”); see also Katherine J. Florey, Indian Country’s Borders: Territo-
riality, Immunity, and the Construction of Tribal Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595, 597 (2010) 
(“Moreover, tribal land holdings themselves have, over the years, been reduced from their historical 
levels by ill-conceived government programs and financial pressures.”). 
 86 See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, 79 Fed. Reg. 4748 (Jan. 29, 2014) (“This notice publishes the current list of 566 
tribal entities recognized and eligible for funding and services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs by 
virtue of their status as Indian tribes.”). 
 87 See Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 398 (Breyer, J., concurring). While this list is recognized as incom-
plete, it does provide a useful general picture of those tribes the Federal Government considered for-
mally recognized in the 1930s. See Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1044. 
 88 See Echo-Hawk, supra note 58. 
 89 See Brief for Nat’l Congress of American Indians, supra note 57, at 12; Brief for United States, 
supra note 33, at 1. 
 90 See Smith, supra note 58, at 1; Capriccioso, supra note 58; Echo-Hawk, supra note 58. Poverty 
remains a widespread problem among Native American populations. See Brief for National Congress of 
American Indians, supra note 57, at 11. Indeed, a chief purpose of both the IRA and the IGRA is eco-
nomic development and independence. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2012); Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish, 
132 S. Ct. at 2211. Beyond gaming, the land-into-trust process has allowed tribes to improve health, 
public safety, and infrastructure on tribal lands. See Brief for National Congress of American Indians, 
supra note 57, at 11–12. 
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tainty and concern to tribes across the United States.91 The en banc panel has 
the opportunity to resolve that uncertainty—or to give it permanence.92 
Tellingly, in April 2014, in Alabama v. PCI Gaming Authority, the U.S. 
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama declined to allow a strikingly 
similar collateral attack on a decades-old land-into-trust decision.93 The en 
banc panel for the Ninth Circuit should similarly refrain from continuing the 
dangerous overextension of Carcieri.94 The court should instead look to its 
own precedent and apply Guidiville, and in so doing, order the State of Cali-
fornia into good-faith compact negotiations with the Big Lagoon Rancheria.95 
CONCLUSION 
If the State of California’s mode of attack in Big Lagoon were timely and 
brought under the APA, Carcieri would offer guidance on the evaluation of its 
challenge. California’s position in Big Lagoon is instead very different: it has 
collaterally attacked a land-into-trust designation as a way to retroactively 
avoid its statutory obligation to negotiate in good faith. Such an attack is 
barred by the APA and subsequent case law. Therefore, with Guidiville, not 
Carcieri, as its guiding precedent, the en banc Ninth Circuit panel should order 
the state to enter into good-faith gaming compact negotiations with the Big 
Lagoon Rancheria. Failure to do so would not only be a continuation of the 
overextension of Carcieri, but would undermine the procedures in place for 
orderly land-into-trust challenges and threaten millions of acres of Indian 
lands. 
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 91 See Smith, supra note 58, at 1; Capriccioso, supra note 58; Echo-Hawk, supra note 58. 
 92 See Brief for Nat’l Congress of American Indians, supra note 57, at 12. 
 93 See PCI Gaming, 2014 WL 1400232, at *15–16. The court granted the Motion to Dismiss for 
Defendants Poarch Band of Creek Indians and the gaming company operating casinos on the tribe’s 
behalf. Id. at *5–6. As in Big Lagoon, the PCI Gaming case arose from a state challenge outside the 
APA of decades-old land-into-trust decisions for a tribe that was not federally recognized in 1934. See 
id. at *15. The PCI court explicitly stated that it “decline[d] to follow the majority’s reasoning in Big 
Lagoon . . . as it [found] more persuasive Big Lagoon’s dissent.” Id. at *17. The court also listed “five 
reasons to question Big Lagoon’s persuasiveness.” Id. Among these were concerns that the Depart-
ment of the Interior was not a party to the action and was unable to provide input to the proceedings. 
Id. 
 94 See Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1045 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting); Brief for Nat’l Congress of 
American Indians, supra note 57, at 6; Brief for United States, supra note 33, at 1. 
 95 See Big Lagoon, 741 F.3d at 1046–47 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting); Lair, 697 F.3d at 1207 (“[A]s 
long as we can apply our prior circuit precedent without ‘running afoul’ of the intervening authority, 
we must do so.” (quoting United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012))). 
